I. INTRODUCTION
In O'Connor v. Ortega,' a plurality of the United States Supreme Court continued an expansion of the "few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions ' 2 to the fourth amendment requirement that an unconsented search be supported by a warrant based upon probable cause. In O'Connor, the Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision 3 that a state government employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets at his place of work. 4 However, the Court reversed the lower court's summary judgment that the government employer's extensive unconsented search of the employee's office, desk, and file cabinets violated his fourth amendment rights. 5 In arriving at an appropriate standard to review the search of a government employee's work area, a plurality of the Court attempted to balance the intrusions on the privacy interests of the individual against the government's need to conduct its business in an efficient and proper manner, 6 holding that "public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances." 7 The plurality noted further that the search must be reasonable both at its inception and in its scope. 8 This Note reviews the O'Connor opinions and concludes that the holding that a government employee has a
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legitimate expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets is consistent with the basic principles of the fourth amendment. However, this Note suggests that the plurality's announced departure from the warrant and probable cause protections of the fourth amendment is an unnecessary and ominous limitation of individual liberty' from unconsented searches. The predictable results of the announced reasonableness standard are confusion over what "reasonable under all the circumstances" actually limits and a corresponding increase in arbitrary intrusions into the legitimate privacy interests of government employees.
II. FACTS
On July 30, 1981, Dr. Magno Ortega, a physician and a psychiatrist for seventeen years at Napa State Hospital, was requested by Dr. Dennis O'Connor, 9 the hospital's Executive Director, to take a paid administrative leave of his position as Chief of Professional Education. 1 0 The justification for the request was to facilitate the investigation of Dr. Ortega regarding possible work-related misconduct concerning the acquisition of a personal computer, 1 alleged incidents of sexual harassment of two female hospital employees, and inappropriate disciplinary action taken against one of the hospital's residents. 12 The four member investigative team selected by Dr. O'Connor was comprised of hospital personnel, including the hospital administrator, Richard Friday, and an internal hospital security guard.' 3 Mr. Friday initiated the search of Dr. Ortega's office at a unidentified point in time during the investigation, the purpose of which was disputed by the parties. 14 Dr. Ortega asserted the search was under-tion was also believed to have been taken home by Dr. Ortega. Id. (plurality opinion).
17 Id. The hospital subsequently modified their previously stated purpose to a need to secure state property. Id. (plurality opinion). 18 Id. (plurality opinion). 19 Id. (plurality opinion). The personal items seized were subsequently used to impeach the credibility of the former resident who had come forward to testify on Dr. Ortega's behalf at his termination proceeding. Id. (plurality opinion). 20 Id. (plurality opinion). 21 Id. (plurality opinion). One of the investigators claimed the task would have been too difficult given the amount of papers in the office. Id. (plurality opinion). 22 Id. 
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for an unlawful search. 2 5 The court of appeals concluded that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and remanded the case for a determination of damages. 2 6 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider, first, whether the respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his work area and, second, the appropriate fourth amendment standard to use in determining the reasonableness of a government employer search of an area in which a government employee does have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
2 7
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. PLURALITY OPINION
In O'Connor v. Ortega, 28 a divided United States Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's grant of summary judgment holding that the facts must be further analyzed under a standard of "reasonableness" to determine whether any violation of Dr. Ortega's fourth amendment rights had occurred. 29 Justice O'Connor delivered the plurality's opinion. 30 She emphasized that although a public employee may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets, 3 ' " ' [w] hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place.' ", 32 Justice O'Connor stated that determining the standard of reasonableness with which to judge a government search of an employee's work area requires a balancing of the government's objectives alleged to justify the search against the intrusiveness of the search upon the individual's fourth amendment rights. 33 Justice O'Connor began her analysis by examining the privacy rights of government employees in the workplace. 3 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW an individual's privacy and personal security interests suffer regardless of whether the search is in connection with an investigation of a criminal violation or a statutory or regulatory violation. 35 She further added that "it would be 'anomolous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.' "36 Justice O'Connor concluded, therefore, that the fourth amendment restrictions were applicable to government employers or supervisors who desired to search their employee's private property.
7
Having determined the applicability of the fourth amendment to the private property of government employees, Justice O'Connor asserted that the standard for determining whether Dr. Ortega's fourth amendment rights have been infringed is whether the search of his office " 'infringed an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.' "38 Although she admitted that there was no explicit criteria to determine society's expectations of privacy, Justice O'Connor noted that prior cases had involved factors such as the intention of the framers of the fourth amendment, the individual's use of the land, and the general mores of society. Justice O'Connor attempted to delineate the different privacy interests at force in the workplace context. She stated that both the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy and the applicable standard with which to assess the reasonableness of a search can change according to the context of a situation. 40 Therefore, Justice O'Connor stated, workplace context must be clearly defined. She reasoned that certain areas of the workplace such as the "hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets, among other areas, are all part of the workplace." 4 1 Moreover, Justice O'Connor emphasized, these areas did not become personal areas through the actions of an employee. Citing Mancusi and Oliver, Justice O'Connor rejected the contention of the Solicitor General and petitioners that a government employee can never have a valid expectation of privacy in a workplace setting. 48 She asserted that fourth amendment rights are not lost simply because one is employed by the government. 49 Justice O'Connor cautioned that "[tihe operational realities of the workplace, however, may make some employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official." 50 Justice O'Connor noted that legitimate regulations or general office practices can diminish reasonable expectations of privacy in offices of both the government as well as the private sector. 5 1 The plurality opinion further suggested that the activities in a typical government office will include many intrusions of a private office by co-workers, superiors, consensual visitors, and the general public. 5 employment relation or the nature of the office can waive any reasonable expectation of privacy in a workplace. 5 3 Because of the possibility of an employee having no reasonable expectation of privacy and the wide range of work environments that exist in the public sector, Justice O'Connor concluded that whether a public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his workplace is a decision to be made on a "case-by-case basis." '54 Justice O'Connor next considered the evidence that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his private office. 5 5 In reviewing the lower court's record, Justice O'Connor revealed that Dr. Ortega occupied his private office for seventeen years and that he kept personal files, personal correspondence, personal financial records, teaching aids and notes, medical files and correspondence from private patients not connected to the hospital, and personal gifts and momentos there. 56 Justice O'Connor noted that the hospital files on residence training were kept outside the office 57 and also that nothing besides personal items were seized. 58 She further commented that the absence of a hospital policy discouraging employees from keeping personal items in their desks or file cabinets supported the validity of Dr. O'Connor's assertion of privacy.
5 9 Justice O'Connor concluded that the court of appeals' holding that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy "at least in his desk and file cabinets" was correct.
60
Justice O'Connor rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis that concluded that Dr. Ortega's fourth amendment rights had been violated merely because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. 6 1 She stressed that finding that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his government office is only the start of the analysis of whether there was a violation of his fourth amendoriginal). However, she went on to state that, as a result of an office's accessibility to other employees or the public, there can be situations in which no expectation of privacy would be considered reasonable. The applicable interests at stake for the employer in a search of an employee's office, the plurality added, are the desire for a productive, efficient office and the related needs of supervision and control. 65 Against the interests of the employer, Justice O'Connor continued, the legitimate privacy interests of the employee must be balanced.
66
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that, except in a small class of exceptional circumstances, a valid search warrant is the requirement for an unconsented search of an individual's private property. 67 She noted that the narrow circumstances that have justified dispensing with the traditional warrant requirement are those in which obtaining a warrant has been "likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." ' 68 As an example of such a situation, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 6 9 held that a warrant was not required in a school environment because it would "unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."
70
Justice O'Connor then reviewed the limited case law dealing with work-related searches by public employers. 7 ' She concluded that the lower court decisions could be summarized as standing generally for the proposition that "any 'work related' search by an em- Justice O'Connor then argued that although public employees can have substantial privacy interests in "private objects" they bring to the workplace, the "realities of the workplace.., strongly suggest that a warrant requirement would be unworkable." 74 In support of this proposition, Justice O'Connor stressed the differences she perceived between a search for evidence to be used in a law enforcement proceeding and the routine needs of co-workers and superiors in a workplace to enter an office for reasons unrelated to criminal misconduct. 75 She reasoned that the government agency's legitimate desire to achieve efficiency can create a pressing need to obtain a file or correspondence from an absent co-worker's office. 76 By analogy, Justice O'Connor inferred that the facts of the instant case could be viewed as arising from a "need to safeguard or identify state property or records in an office in connection with a pending investigation into suspected employee malfeasance. ' 7 7 Justice O'Connor concluded that a warrant requirement for a work-related search would be "unduly burdensome" and would "seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business. ' 78 Furthermore, she asserted that the warrant procedures are "unwieldly" and would be unreasonable requirements for a supervisor to become familiar with. 79 Justice O'Connor emphasized that the concern that expansion of constitutional issues that can be challenged in government 72 Id. (plurality opinion). See United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 111 I, 1123 (7th Cir. 1973)(holding that searches and seizures by public employers are reasonable under the fourth amendment if they are "work related"); United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863, 868 (2nd Cir. 1965)(concluding that a search and seizure was valid because it was conducted pursuant to "the power of the Government as defendant's employer, to supervise and investigate the performance of his duties as a Customs employee").
73 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1500 (plurality opinion here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard." 8 2 Justice O'Connor added that for administrative searches an administrative warrant issued on the basis of a reasonable legislative or administrative standard, rather than a finding of probable cause, has been held valid by the Court. 8 3 Further, the plurality noted that there are a multitude of contexts that can arise in which a public employer will have a desire to intrude upon the privacy of an employee. 8 4 She stressed that the fourth amendment standard of reasonableness to be determined is limited "only" for the employer intrusions outlined. 5 Justice O'Connor then reiterated the strong government interest in the operation of an efficient workplace. 8 6 She emphasized that the "work of these [government] agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they entered an employee's desk for the purpose of finding a file or a piece of office correspondence. ' 8 7 Furthermore, she contended that given that traditional probable cause analysis has developed in the criminal investigatory context, there is little logic to support the use of probable cause in a noninvestigatory work-related situation. noninvestigatory reasons. ' "89 According to the plurality, requiring a standard of probable cause for a search to investigate a public employee's misfeasance would not only impose "intolerable burdens on public employers," but also would result in "tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency's work, and ultimately to the public interest." 90 Supporting this position, Justice O'Connor reasserted the importance of the proper operation and efficiency of government agencies both to the agencies as well as to the public interest. 9 1 She further emphasized the distinctions between the interests involved in a criminal investigation and those present in an investigation of work-related misfeasance. 92 Whereas enforcing criminal law is in the interest of law enforcement agents, Justice O'Connor believed that "ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner" is the overriding concern of the government agent.
93
In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that, as with school teachers, supervisors in most government agencies possess neither the training nor the experience to make informed, quick judgments as to whether a probable cause standard is satisfied. 94 She stressed that while law enforcement officers are expected to learn the intricacies of the standard, it would be unrealistic to require the same training of government employers and supervisors. 9 5 The plurality therefore stated that a "reasonableness" standard would be more appropriate because it would allow proper "regulation of the employee's conduct 'according to the dictates of reason and common sense.' " 96 Justice O'Connor again alluded to the employee's privacy interests, but asserted that they are far less compelling than the privacy interests that can be found in the home. 9 
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purpose of providing employee offices is to give the employees a place to do their work. 9 9 If employees wanted to keep anything private, the plurality continued, they could simply leave their personal items at home. 1 00 Justice O'Connor stressed that government employers possess "special needs" beyond those of normal law enforcement to make intrusions on employee privacy for work-related noninvestigatory reasons or for investigations of employee misfeasance. o 1 0 As a result, she concluded, the probable cause standard is impracticable.
10 2
In addition, Justice O'Connor stated a standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden a government agency's efforts to run efficiently, nor allow arbitrary intrusions of an employee's privacy.' 0 3
Therefore, Justice O'Connor announced, the appropriate standard for government intrusions of a public employee's fourth amendment right to privacy in the workplace for work-related noninvestigation purposes and for investigations of employee misfeasance is "reasonableness under all the circumstances."' 1 0 4
Justice O'Connor added that the standard of reasonableness must be satisfied with regards both to the inception of the search and to the scope of the intrusion. Specifically, the plurality stated that " [d] etermining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider 'whether the . . .action was justified at its inception,'1 0 5 ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' "106 Justice O'Connor further added that a government employer's investigatory search to prove employee misfeasance or an intrusion for a noninvestigatory work-related reason would bejustified at their inception provided that reasonable grounds exist to suggest that the intrusions will achieve the desired objectives. According to Justice O'Connor, the scope of the search will be justified 99 Id. (plurality opinion). The plurality next addressed whether the search of Dr. Ortega's office met the standard of reasonableness that had been set forth. Justice O'Connor noted that because no evidentiary hearings had been held, 1 0 8 the record was insufficient to determine the reasonableness of the search.' 0 9 Justice O'Connor asserted that an evidentiary hearing was necessary as the parties had, and continued to have, a material dispute over the initial justification for the search of Dr. Ortega's office." 0 Justice O'Connor stated that the petitioners had continuously maintained that the intrusion was necessary to secure state-owned property in Dr. Ortega's office."' She also noted that the petitioners had originally maintained that the search was a routine inventory of property and in accordance with standard hospital procedures for a departing, terminated, or separated employee." 2 However, the plurality stated that Dr. Ortega had not been terminated from employment at the time of the initial search and that the record did not disclose whether the policy applied to persons placed upon administrative leave." l 3 Justice O'Connor also noted Dr. Ortega's contention that the search was to discover evidence with which to establish a basis for his termination. 1 14 She conceded, as Dr. Ortega contended, that no inventory had been taken of the property in his office, and the items that were seized in the search eventually were used in the administrative proceedings. (plurality opinion). In a deposition, the leader of the investigative team, Mr. Friday, suggested that the search was initiated to "'make sure that we had our state property identified, and in order to provide Dr. Ortega with his property and get what we had out of there, in order to make sure our resident's files were protected, and that sort of stuff.'" Id. (plurality opinion). 112 Id. (plurality opinion). This was asserted by the petitioners in their motion for summary judgment in the district court. 
cluded that the summary judgment granted to the petitioners by the district court was in error because of its reliance on a hospital policy that was nonexistent and because of the factual matters that were in dispute." l 6 Additionally, Justice O'Connor stated that the district court did not provide any findings concerning the scope of the search that was undertaken."
7
Justice O'Connor finally considered the court of appeals' granting of summary judgment for Dr. Ortega and concluded that it was incorrect. 1 1 8 She stated that although the court recognized that there was no policy applicable to the search undertaken by the hospital, the analysis must consider whether the search was reasonable even in the absence of such a policy. 1 9 In addition, Justice O'Connor asserted that "[a] search to secure state property is valid as long as petitioners had a reasonable belief that there was government property in Dr. Ortega's office which needed to be secured, and the scope of the intrusion was itself reasonable in light of its justification."'1 20 Because the facts as presented by the petitioners could possibly meet the standard as articulated, Justice O'Connor concluded that the court of appeals' granting of summary judgment was inappropriate and that the case must be remanded to the district court1 2 1
B.
CONCURRING OPINION Justice Scalia concurred with the plurality, concluding that the case should be reversed and remanded. However,Justice Scalia disagreed with both the rationale and the fourth amendment standard set forth.' 22 He argued that, contrary to the plurality's contention, fourth amendment protections of privacy are not a question of "whether [an] 
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tice Scalia rejected the plurality's direction that the issue of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed should be determined on a "case-by-case" basis. 12 5 Justice Scalia stressed the continuing difficulties created for the police, the courts, and the citizens by a case-by-case factual analysis to determine fourth amendment standards for protection of privacy.
126
Justice Scalia stated that he disagreed with the plurality, as their standard would result in Dr. Ortega losing his reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the hospital officials had "extensive 'work-related reasons to enter [his] office.' "127 According to justice Scalia, the issue of privacy rights in an office had been settled in Mancusi v. DeForte,1 28 in which it was stated that an employee's "personal office is constitutionally protected against warrantless intrusions by the police, even though employer and co-workers are not excluded." 129 Justice Scalia continued that whether the government or a private entity is the employer should not effect the analysis of whether an employee has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the workplace.' 30 He emphasized that "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer."'' 1 Justice Scalia further disagreed with the plurality's reasoning that the nature of an expectation of privacy changed according to whether the searcher was a law enforcement officer or a supervisor. 132 He contended that the status of the searcher speaks to whether the search was reasonable, not to whether there was a plurality was so devoid of content that it would lead to increased uncertainty in the field. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) . 125 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 126 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)("This Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances.").
127 107 S. Ct. at 1505 (Scalia, J., concurring)(quoting id. at 1498 (plurality opinion)). Justice Scalia added that a father's fourth amendment rights are not diminished in his home by a family's movement throughout the house, and, similarly, a tenant's rights are not extinguished by a landlord's right of entry onto the premises. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
128 392 U.S. 364 (1968) . In this case, the Court held that an employee's office at the union headquarters was protected by the fourth amendment, although, implicitly, the protection excluded union "higher ups." O'Connor, 107 S. Ct 
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fourth amendment protection of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 13 3 Justice Scalia asserted determining the reasonableness of a given intrusion is a matter for a more "global" analysis.' 3 4 Justice Scalia concluded that he would hold that "the offices of government employees, and afortiori the drawers and files within those offices, are covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter."' 3 5 He added that because Dr. Ortega's office was undisputedly private and there were no special circumstances presented to suggest a deviation from the normal rule, he would hold that the lower court rulings that Dr. Ortega was protected by the fourth amendment were correct.' 3 6
Justice Scalia then stated that the key issue of the case was whether the search of Dr. Ortega's office was reasonable; to answer that question, the status of the searchers is relevant.' 3 7 While Justice Scalia acknowledged that generally a valid warrant based upon probable cause has been required to justify an unconsented search, he noted that "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement"' 3 8 have provided grounds for an exception to the rule. Justice Scalia asserted that the case of government employers is one with "special needs."' 9 He noted that government employers have the same needs for quick access to employees' offices and desks for work-related purposes as their private counterparts. Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, when a search is "to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules-searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context-do not violate the Fourth Amendment."' 14 0 As with the plurality, Justice Scalia found the record wanting as to the purpose of the search of Dr. Ortega's office, and consequently agreed that the lower court's ruling for summary judgment should be re-133 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) . 134 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia cites an example in which a firefighter intrudes upon a household in an effort to fight a fire. Justice Scalia advocates that the analysis must then ask whether that intrusion was reasonable as opposed to whether a tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy from intrusions by his landlord. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) .
135 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia added that a qualifier was necessary to provide for the situation in which a government employee's office is completely open to the public and hence has no expectation of privacy. 42 He stressed that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, that there existed no factual dispute as to the nature of the investigatory search, and that there were no "special needs"' 4 3 that justified dispensing with the warrant and probable cause standard. 144 Justice Blackmun stated that the traditional standard had clearly not been satisfied prior to the search of Dr. Ortega's work area, and, thus, his fourth amendment rights had been violated. 14 5 According to Justice Blackmun, the plurality's problems were a result of their "failure or unwillingness to realize that the facts here are clear."' 14 6 Thus, Justice Blackmun applied the traditional standard of "special need" articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and concluded that Dr. Ortega's fourth amendment rights were clearly violated. He noted that because the plurality contended that there was a factual dispute about whether the search was investigatory in nature or routine, the plurality felt compelled to announce a new standard of reasonableness for work-related intrusions that stood alone from the case at bar.' 4 7
Justice Blackmun, in particular, disagreed with the plurality's analysis because he believed the issues involved in O'Connor had not been adjudicated extensively. 148 He asserted that proper fourth amendment analysis had always included a fact-based examination and that it was inappropriate for the plurality to formulate a new standard without considering the facts of the instant case.' 49 Justice Blackmun conceded that there have been reservations expressed concerning the use of a case-by-case type of factual analysis for determining fourth amendment standards. 150 However, he suggested that, given the multitude of scenarios that could be imagined in the workplace context, a case-by-case type of analysis might be justi-
fled.' 5 1 Justice Blackmun stated that in developing a standard for a type of workplace intrusion, the Court must be guided by a "concrete set of facts" to arrive at a rule that embraces a specific circumstance.
2
Justice Blackmun further asserted that by removing the facts from their analysis, the plurality failed to follow the constraints of prior authority and articulated an unprincipled, possibly biased standard in contrast with the long held fourth amendment standard requiring a warrant based upon probable cause for an unconsented search. 15 3 Indeed, Justice Blackmun went so far as to say that "the plurality has assumed the existence of hypothetical facts from which its standard follows."' 15 4 In support of his contention that what occurred was clearly a search of an investigatoy nature, Justice Blackmun briefly reviewed the factual record. 15 5 He stressed that it is not clear how the search of Dr. Ortega's office can be described as one for inventory purposes. 156 Justice Blackmun reiterated the plurality's concession that the search could not have been undertaken pursuant to the hospital policy of inventorying property of all terminated employees as Dr. Ortega had not been terminated at the time the searches occurred. 15 7 In addition, he noted that there was no hospital policy to inventory state property in the offices of employees on administrative leave. 153 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1507 n.3 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun suggested that when facts are abandoned in the analysis of a cse, judicial "predilections" surface and greatly influence the formation of the resulting standard that is articulated. He noted Justice Cardozo's warning that below every person's conscious there are 'other forces, the likes and dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.'" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 158 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that in addition to concluding incorrectly that the hospital had an inventory policy that applied to the search at Justice Blackmun also disputed the plurality's assertion that the lack of a hospital policy to support the inventorying of an employee's office when that employee has been placed on administrative leave does not necessarily make the purpose untrue.' 5 9 He acknowledged the evidence of a concern by the hospital over the whereabouts of a computer and also some work files of Dr. Ortega but stressed that these concerns were not supported by the record as the real reason for the intrusion. 160 Justice Blackmun stated that the leader of the "investigative team," Mr. Friday, was on the record as denying that the computer had anything to do with the purpose of the initial search.' 6 1 Similarly, Justice Blackmun added that Dr. O'Connor stated the computer was a focus of the investigation in regards to its acquisition but was not the primary purpose of the intrusion into Dr. Ortega's office. 1
62
While Justice Blackmun conceded that there was deposition testimony to the effect that the intrusion of Dr. Ortega's office was undertaken in part to separate personal from state property, 163 he emphasized that this contention was "overwhelmingly contradicted" by other testimony and by the actual search itself. 164 Justice Blackmun noted that Dr. O'Connor had repeatedly referred to the people who searched Dr. Ortega's office as "investigators." 16 5 He also noted that even when Dr. O'Connor was speaking of the search as an inventory, he referred to the proceedings as an investigation. 166 Justice Blackmun stated that, as the plurality recognized, no formal inventory was ever taken of the contents of Dr. Ortega's office. 16 7 Furthermore, he stated that the items that were seized after the extensive search were highly personal and used later in termination hearings to impeach a witness who appeared on Dr. Ortega's behalf. Lastly, Justice Blackmun highlighted the fact that the search was issue, the district court also erroneously stated that Dr. Ortega had notice and opportunity to witness the search. Id. at 1507 n.4. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) .
159 Id. at 1507-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 160 Id. at 1508 (Blackmun, J., dissenting Basically what we were trying to do is to remove what was obviously State records or records that had to do with his program, his department, any of the materials that would be involved in running the residency program, around contracts, around the computer, around the areas that we were interested in investigating. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) . 167 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) .
[
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conducted at night 6 8 and subsequent to the obtaining of legal advice. 16 9 He concluded that the search was both exceptional in nature and undertaken for the purpose of investigating Dr. Ortega. As a result, Justice Blackmun stated that no significant factual dispute existed in the case.
170
Justice Blackmun next examined the plurality's analysis of a public employee's fourth amendment rights in his workplace.' 7 ' He stressed that he agreed with the important conclusion of the plurality that Dr. Ortega did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets.' 72 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun noted that the plurality was correct in conceding that Dr. Ortega also had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. 173 Justice Blackmun recognized other areas of agreement with the plurality such as the statement that "[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer."' 74 He further stated his agreement with the plurality's assertion that, in some circumstances, an employee's expectation of privacy can be diminished through the "operational realities" of the work environment. 175 However, Justice Blackmun stated he was in sharp disagreement with the observation by the plurality that a public employee could forfeit all of his expectations of privacy as a result of routine office intrusions.' 76 Justice Blackmun criticized the plurality's suggestion as being inconsistent with the expectations of privacy that have traditionally been afforded to offices. 177 Occasional business-related visitors, Justice Blackmun asserted, are the norm in our society and as such have been implicitly recognized in prior fourth amendment decisions protecting the office.
178
Justice Blackmun accepted the plurality's view that the expectation of privacy for an employee is contingent on the nature of the 168 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) . 169 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) . 170 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) . 171 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) . 172 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) . 17" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) . See id. at 1498. 174 Id. at 1508 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1498). 175 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting id. at 1498). 176 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) . 177 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) . See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n. proposed intrusion. 17 9 He stated that traditional fourth amendment protection is applicable in different degrees according to the context of the privacy asserted.
18 0 However, Justice Blackmun quoted with approval Justice Scalia's assertion that "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer." 1 8 1 Justice Blackmun concluded that whereas an employee might not have an expectation of privacy against a co-worker visiting his office occasionally, he would be protected against an after-hours search of his locked private office by an "investigative team seeking materials to be used against him at a termination proceeding." 182 Justice Blackmun asserted that the plurality has not sufficiently acknowledged the reality of the workplace in modern society.' 8 3 Emphasizing the long hours at work experienced by many, Justice Blackmun noted that such a routine has created a necessity of overlap between home and work life.' 84 He elaborated that personal calls, visitors, and business reg- 181 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original)). 182 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also quoted a recently reported statement by Attorney General Edwin Meese embodying the general idea that a person has an expectation of privacy in materials left in his office. Responding to a question concerning a search of government employee's offices and seizure of material related to an alleged illegal diversion of government funds to a Central American group, the Attorney General stated: "'I'm not sure we would have any opportunity or any legal right to get those personal papers. There was certainly no evidence of criminality that would have supported a search warrant at the time. I don't think public employees' private documents belong to the Government.'" Id. at 1509 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ( 1, 3, 13-15 (1986) .
The myth of "separate worlds"-one of work and the other of family life-long harbored by employers, unions, and even workers themselves has been effectively laid to rest. Their inseparability is undeniable, particularly as two-earner families have become the norm where they once were the exception and as a distressing number of single parents are required to raise children on their own. The import of work-family conflicts-for the family, for the workplace, and, indeed, for the whole of society-will grow as these demographic and social transformations in the roles of men and women come to be more fully clarified and appreciated. BNA SPECIAL REPORT, WORK & FAMILY: A CHANGING DYNAMIC 13-15 (1986).
186 O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1510 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1498). Justice Blackmun argued also that the plurality's implicit contention that the ownership of much of the elements of the workplace would lessen the employees' expectation of privacy is in error. He derives the implication from the plurality's description of what constitutes the workplace context ("the hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets"), as opposed to the employee's "closed personal luggage, a handbag or a briefcase." Id. at 1510 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1497). Justice Blackmun emphasized that earlier decisions of the Court have settled that expectations of privacy under the fourth amendment are not dependent upon ownership of the area. Id.; see e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)(the protection of the fourth amendment is contingent upon the individual having a reasonable expectation of privacy, not upon owning the property that is invaded); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)(fourth amendment protects people, not simply "areas"). Although Justice Blackmun conceded that the fact of ownership is relevant to the appropriate level of an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy, it does not act to deny fourth amendment protections to an individual. O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1510 n.7 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
187 107 S. Ct. at 1510 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
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"special need" inquiry, Justice Blackmun argued that there was insufficient analysis devoted to determining whether there was any "special need" present before the plurality went on to a balancing test. 200 In O'Connor, however, Justice Blackmun stressed that the omission was critical, as there was no "special need" discernible from the facts presented that would make the acquisition of a warrant based on probable cause "impracticable. ' 20 ' Justice Blackmun reiterated that the facts suggested that while Dr. Ortega was on administrative leave and not permitted to enter the hospital grounds, a search of his office was commenced that was investigatory in nature with the primary purpose of obtaining evidence of Dr. Ortega's management improprieties. 20 2 Justice Blackmun reasoned that obtaining a search warrant from a magistrate would not have acted to frustrate the hospital management goals of "an effective institution devoted to training and healing, to which the disciplining of [h]ospital employees contributed.
' 20 3
Moreover, Justice Blackmun stated that the search of Dr. Ortega's office was a situation in which enlisting the aid of an impartial magistrate would have been a particularly appropriate check of the intrusions into Dr. Ortega's privacy. 20 4 He added that having to articulate both the justification and the explicit items the searchers hoped to find would have acted to prevent the indiscriminant "rummaging through the doctor's office, desk and file cabinets." 20 5 Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded that because no "special need" existed justifying dispensing with the traditional fourth amendment standard of a warrant based on probable cause, and because the petitioners would have failed to meet this standard, the holding of the court of appeals that the petitioners violated Dr. Ortega's fourth amendment rights should be affirmed. 20 6 Justice Blackmun next addressed the balancing analysis of the plurality in regards to the warrant requirement, stating that even if he accepted the plurality's contention that there was a "special need" to dispense with the traditional warrant and probable cause SUPREME COURT REVIEW standard, the plurality's balancing was "seriously flawed." 20 7 Again he asserted that the plurality had erred by removing the facts from their analysis and arriving at conclusions based upon "assumed" facts. 208 Justice Blackmun criticized the plurality for "sweeping with a broad brush" with their announced conclusion that because a warrant requirement would "seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome," 20 9 it would not be required for public employer searches of employee offices, desks, or file cabinets. 2 10 Justice Blackmun noted that the reasoning advanced by the plurality for their conclusion was based on maintaining the efficient operation of government agencies. 2 1 1 Further, he noted that the plurality claimed the warrant requirement would be too "unwieldy" to employers unfamiliar with it. 212 Justice Blackmun emphasized that the Court in the past had not deviated from the traditional fourth amendment standard except in situations in which there was no other alternative. 2 1 3 Although the Court on occasion has found it necessary to adopt a new standard, 
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SEARCHES BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS could only be arrived at when the analysis was removed, as it was, from a concrete factual situation. 2 1 7 He acknowledged that a warrant should not be required for every "routine entry into an employee's workplace;" 2 18 however, the dissent admonished the view that this fact justified dispensing with a warrant for every work-related search. 2 1 9 Justice Blackmun stated that the warrant requirement would be appropriate for many employer searches, including the one of Dr. Ortega's office. 220 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun stressed that the plurality has not articulated how the new standard will maintain the "neutral scrutiny of ajudge." '22 Instead, noted Justice Blackmun, the plurality completely neglected to relate the announced "reasonableness under all the circumstances" standard with any of the principles behind the warrant standard. 22 2 Justice Blackmun concluded that "the plurality's general result [was] preordained because, cut off from a particular factual setting, it cannot make the necessary distinctions among types of searches, or formulate an alternative to the warrant requirement that derives from a precise weighing of competing interests." 2 23
Next, Justice Blackmun noted that the plurality's analysis of an alternative to the probable cause standard began with a contradiction. 22 4 Although the plurality stated that the new standard announced was "only" applicable to a "noninvestigatory work-related intrusion" and an "investigatory search for evidence of suspected work-related employee misfeasance," Justice Blackmun suggested that it would be difficult to imagine a search that would not fall within one of these broad general catagories. 2 25 Moreover, argued Justice Blackmun, given that the standard announced by the plurality to be utilized on remand was for both the "inventory" and "in-vestigatory" searches described by the plurality, the plurality has announced a standard that will apply to all public employer workrelated searches.
6
Justice Blackmun also criticized the plurality for their use of a balancing of interests analysis to dispense with the probable cause standard. 22 7 He asserted that, as with the analysis required to justify a lesser standard than a warrant requirement, probable cause requires the same critical search for alternatives. 2 28 Justice Blackmun emphasized that the plurality did not attempt to satisfy that requirement for either an inventory or an investigatory search.
9 Justice
Blackmun conceded that public employers have a valid interest in eliminating work-related misfeasance and maintaining efficiency. He further conceded that public employees may have limited expectations of privacy at work. However, Justice Blackmun stressed that, even if these facts are true, the plurality has not explained why the standard they arrived at "necessarily leads to the standard borrowed from New Jersey v. T.L.O., as opposed to other imaginable standards." 23 1 Lastly, Justice Blackmun continued, the plurality did not explain why probable cause, which has been "characterized by this Court as a 'practical, nontechnical conception,' "232 would not provide adequate protection for public employers in a case like O'Connor. 873, 881 (1975) . Justice Blackmun chastised the plurality for simply giving conclusory assertions instead of explaining the balancing that was alleged to have occurred. He cited in support of his critical assessment the statements of the plurality that the probable cause requirement would "'impose intolerable burdens on public employers' "; that government employers would suffer "'tangible and often irreparable damage' "; and finally that employers cannot be expected " 'to learn the subtleties of the probable cause standard.' " O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 1514 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun emphasized that "[s]uch assertions cannot pass for careful balancing on the facts of this case, given that the search was conducted during Dr. Ortega's administrative leave... with the advice of counsel, and by an investigating party that included a security officer." Id. at 1514 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229 107 S. Ct. at 1513 n.12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting 
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In conclusion, Justice Blackmun recognized that new areas of fourth amendment analysis have surfaced that require careful analy-
SiS. 2 3 4
He admonished the Court to examine closely the practical realities of the situation presented along with the interests involved before abandoning the traditonal safeguards of the fourth amendment for a new standard derived from a balancing test. 23 5 Justice Blackmun asserted that " [b] y ignoring the specific facts of this case, and by announcing in the abstract a standard as to the reasonableness of an employer's workplace searches, the plurality undermines not only the Fourth Amendment rights of public employees but also any further analysis of the constitutionality of public employer searches." 2 36
IV. DISCUSSIONAND ANALYsIS
The plurality decision in O'Connor v. Ortega represented an effort by members of the Supreme Court to carve out a broad exception, for the benefit of government employers, to the traditional fourth amendment protections of searches provided by a warrant requirement and a probable cause standard. However, the plurality failed to adequately distinguish the individual privacy interests infringed upon in an investigatory search for evidence of employee misfeasance and in a routine work-related intrusion. As a result, the plurality arrived at a ill-defined "reasonableness under all of the circumstances" standard for virtually all employer workplace privacy intrusions. The "reasonableness" standard announced by the plurality would appear to provide adequate protection for government employees from the minimally intrusive routine work-related office entries by their government employers. Nevertheless, the standard does not provide adequate protection of public employees' legiti-
